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Posted at 06:11 PM | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Posted at 09:50 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
In the previous blog we addressed the main dynamics driving the HSPD-12 implementation. In this blog we will look at core components of a successful HSPD-12 Program.
The HSPD-12 Mandate provides a Common Identification Standard for Managing Access to Information and Services across Federal Agencies. In short, it mandates a common, interoperable identification standard for managing access to information and systems for, within, or among Federal agencies and departments. It also addresses interagency interoperability and compels Federal agencies to adopt stronger security standards and procedures. In addition, it provides consistency for issuing identity credentials to employees and contractors and addresses both access to physical facilities and logical assets.
Key Components
A Strong HSPD-12 Program includes the following components:
Agencies implementing FIPS 201 must assign an individual to the role of PIV Senior Agency Official for Privacy and conduct Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on systems containing information in identifiable form (IIF). They shall consult with personnel responsible for privacy issues at the implementing agency/department while developing the PIV system and write, publish, and maintain a comprehensive “system of records” document for the PIV system. This also means maintaining appeals procedures for those who are denied a credential or whose credentials are revoked and establish consequences for violating privacy policies of the PIV system. Finally agencies need to assure that the technologies used in the department or agency’s implementation of the PIV system allow for continuous auditing of compliance with stated privacy policies and practices governing the collection, use, and distribution of information in the operation of the program.
The OMB underscored the need for privacy measures in PIV implementations. In April, the Office of Management and Budget released draft PIV implementation guidance that re-emphasized the necessity of adhering to the privacy goals of HSPD-12. Specifically, the guidance re-emphasized the following activities for implementing agencies:
In order to meet Federal compliance requirement, a well-documented Certification and Accrediation (C&A) process has been identified as a core compoent of an HSPD-12 Program. The C&A is usually based on NIST 800-53 standards with emphasis on Access Control and Identification and Authenction Requiremenet.
Continue reading "What Components need to be included in a strong HSPD12 Program?" »
Posted at 01:40 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wireless technology is taking its place in today’s society, thus increasing the demand for wireless LAN. Risks once associated with WLAN can be easily mitigated due to the advancement in WLAN security.
With the increase in and popularization of various mobile computing devices such as laptops, and PDAs, more people need to access the network to perform a variety of data transference functions at any time in any place. WLANs offer a new dimension in productivity for users. A Gartner study suggested that enterprises could expect a 22 percent productivity improvement by introducing WLANs.
To evaluate the main implications of using WLAN form the security perspective, we need to look at both the benefits and the potential risks of introducing such technology into the LAN landscape.
WLAN benefits can be expressed as follows:
Potential Risks introduced by WLAN are the following:
4 Rogue access points
4 Traffic analysis and eavesdropping
4 MAC spoofing/session hijacking
4 Denial of Service (DOS)
4 Masquerading
4 Modification of data
4 Increased system complexity from switch locations in various areas due to limited rack space
4 Effectively planning and configuring wireless backbone
4 Greater network management costs associated with wireless specific activities (managing coverage, network activity)
4 Procurement of user’s wireless hardware (wireless card, laptop or other required equipment) incurred in addition to the expense of established hardware refresh cycle
Each organization needs to look at the benefits and the potential risks introduced with using WLAN technology and judge its overall impact on its business goals and strategic objectives. Judging from the latest trend in the corporate world, as the security concerns raised form the use of WLAN are being addressed by technologies such as 802.11i, more and more companies are willing to assume the risks that come with opening up their network to wireless traffic and benefit from the flexibility of WLAN technology.
In the next blog we will look at the major areas that need to be addressed in order to successfully secure a wireless environment.
Posted at 09:03 PM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Introduction
IPv4-based networks form most of today's networks due to its relative resilience in spite of its age. Cracks have however been apearing on a new version of the protocol has been in the work.
All new techniques introduced to overcome some of the IPv4’s most-known security deficiencies (SSL, IPSec, etc.) have been judedged useful but insufficient. In other words, despite all recent improvements, the supporting Internet infrastructure continues to lack the appropriate security framework.
IPv4 security issues
Security was not a primary concern when designing IPv4. Basically, the idea was to establish an end-to-end pipe with no regards for security. The end-nodes where assumed address security requirements such as encryption and digital signing (e-mail applications would perform own encryption).
The following resilience requirement are needed to deal with security threats:
IPv4 short term remedies
To deal with IPv4 security limitations, certain techniques such as Network Address Translation (NAT) and Network Address Port Translation (NAPT) have been developed . They can offer certain level of protection against some of the security threats addressed above. Also, the introduction of IPSec facilitated the use of encryption communication, although its implementation is optional and continues to be the sole responsibility of the end nodes.
The Network Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed in 1998 a new suite of protocols called the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) to deal with the limitations of the current Internet infrastructure . This new suite of protocols aims to deal with a number of the issues that affect IPv4-based networks, including its lack of network level security.
Posted at 11:02 AM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Background
A new report filed by federal security auditors finds that that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had almost 500 laptop computers lost or stolen over the last three years, many of which were loaded with sensitive taxpayer information. The report contends that between 2003 and 2006 the IRS had some 490 laptops lost or stolen in 387 individual incidents.
Perhaps the most notorious loss of a laptop in the federal sector came in May 2006 when a contractor working with the Department of Veterans Affairs had a computer stolen from his that carried the personal data of an estimated 26.5 million people. The laptop was eventually recovered by law enforcement officials.
In addition to failing to properly secure their devices in and out of the office, the auditors said that some of the IRS' 100,000 employees were not properly encrypting data on their machines or utilizing adequate password protections.
In their final recommendations, the auditors recommend that IRS leaders refine their incident response procedures to ensure for better understanding of any potential data exposure and more frequently remind employees to use proper device security measures. The report also contends that the agency should consider implementing a "systemic disk encryption solution" on its laptops that does not rely on employee interaction to protect sensitive information.
Systemic Disk Encryption Solution
Security mechanisms to consider when evaluating the right disk encryption solution could be expressed as follows:
Policy: Which policies and certifications are required by the organization
Information architecture: Where sensitive information is stored
Application architecture: How the application uses information
Communication: How the devices communicates
Device Management: How the device is managed
Primary use of the device: An office automation tool, industrial purposes, or mobile communication
Selection Criteria
Given the recent high profile announcements with regards to the loss of laptops and the associated liabilities to organizations that fail to take the appropriate steps with regards to addressing mobile devices vulnerabilities, I decided to take a look at Full Disk and Folder Encryption products that are commercially available today that help mitigate mobile device vulnerabilities.
The factors contained in the following table should help you in going through the process of selecting disk and folder encryption products:
Area of Comparison |
Full Disk Encryption |
Folder Encryption |
Encrypts the entire disk |
The entire disk is encrypted |
Only selected files and folders are encrypted |
Impact on the computer system |
MBR is modified |
Operating system files are excluded |
Platform support |
Generally limited to single desktops and mobile computer systems |
May not be used on most systems |
Authentication options |
Limited to drivers available at pre-boot. Vendors are expanding the capabilities to include network connectivity |
Generally, any authentication mechanism supported by the operating system |
Multiple user authentications |
Authentication required at pre-boot Authentication maybe be synchronized or linked to network authentication |
May require authentication on file access can be linked to the operating system or network authentication |
System maintenance |
Reboots during patching may be a problem |
No issues during maintenance |
Backups |
Information is generally not encrypted if the backup runs within the operating system |
Information may be encrypted or not depending on how backups perform |
User control |
User makes no determination as to whether to encrypt a file or not |
User may have control over which files are encrypted. New policy-based products transfer encryption decisions to administrator |
Posted at 10:14 AM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Technorati Tags: disk encryption, folder encryption, it consulting, laptop security
As a number of readers have pointed out, supporting concurrent access to multiple cards would be another way to avoid requiring customers to swap cards in order to sign in using a different profile.
As much as I wish this approach could be pursued, I think it would be problematic.
Concurrent access is not common industry practice and (perhaps most troublesome of all) changes in the application software code may be required to concurrently access multiple cards from a given process. This is b/c such access would have to be segregated into different threads, and application software is currently single–threaded.
Posted at 04:21 PM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
What might be next - an upcoming change in Smart Card technology and/or configuration:
At present, Smart Cards do not support the storage and concurrent use of multiple PKI profiles. Because today's Cards lack the ability to store multiple profiles on a card, and because only one card/token is typically supported per client, customers will need to physically swap cards to use different signing profiles. I believe that the inconvenience of this will force a change (and in the near future), and am interested in discussing the implications of this.
Posted at 02:43 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The selection criteria for the HSM within the context of PKI implementations, can be broadly grouped into the following categories: Operational Quality, Scalability, Functionality and Vendor Health. A description of the selection criteria follows:
Operational Quality:
Resiliency & reliability: The large capacity HSM customers will expect months of continuous operations and the ability to deploy resilient configurations of HSM(s) where a single HSM failure does not result in an application failure.
Product lifecycle: Selected HSM(s) should have a product lifecycle compatible with your organization’ needs with the actual lifecycle dependent on the cost of acquiring, distributing and upgrading the customer premises technology.
Durability: Customers should be able to subject HSM to continuous duty cycle for extended periods each day.
Operational support: Vendors should be able to provide service level agreements in line with your 24x7 support model. The large capacity HSM(s) should provide the necessary audit and trace information to enable effective helpdesk & operational support procedures.
Scalability:
Performance: A small capacity HSM supporting 0.25 TPS and a large capacity HSM supporting 40+ TPS.
Capacity: The large capacity HSM needs to support storage of multiple PKI identities.
Scalable footprint: The large capacity HSM(s) should be able to scale both vertically and horizontally
Functionality:
PKI support: HSM must offer the following security features - 2048-bit (the expected key length size necessary for proper security of PKI) key pair generation, private key storage, and private cryptographic operations. The HSM must be compatible with the Public-Key Cryptography Standards #11 (PKCS#11) standard and certified for usage with Entrust PKI software.
Security level: Vendors that verify their security implementations by subjecting them to government and industry driven security validation programs are preferred. Compatibility with FIPS level-2 or higher is required.
OS certification: Vendors should be capable of certifying their products on your supported Operating Systems.
Connectivity: Large capacity HSM(s) should be LAN connected and multi-server shareable. The small capacity HSM(s) should allow for USB connectivity.
Vendor Health & Focus:
Vendor size: Large publicly held vendors are preferred as they would have substantial resources to support our needs and it is easier to monitor their financial health.
Existing relationship: Vendors with existing relationship are preferred as the organization already has worked out commercial and legal contract terms and conditions with them and has experience working with them.
Mission-critical deployments: Vendors with mission critical customer deployments are preferred.
Status as a ‘top account’: Any new commercial technology needs to be supported by a strong vendor relationship. Being a top account gives us sufficient leverage to ensure timely resolution of problems.
Posted at 10:06 PM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
A hardware security module (HSM) is a device that provides a secure and dedicated environment for performing cryptographic operations thus reducing the likelihood of secret key material being compromised as well as improving cryptographic processing performance. Here we try to address the secret key protection aspect of using HSMs.
Confidential electronic keys, such as those used by the PKI private key are critical to application security. If their confidentiality is compromised, a fraudulent message purporting to be from a legitimate user can be sent to another user. The receiver of such a message may not be able to detect this fraud, because the signature appended to the message would appear to be valid. Accordingly, it is critical that confidential keys be adequately protected.
The first step to protecting confidential keys is to have good controls on access to environments where the keys are created and where they reside. For additional protection, one approach is to employ various software techniques to secure the keys on the host computer where the keys reside, and where they are used for cryptographic operations. Typically, the keys are encrypted on disk, and memory protection measures are employed to protect the key during cryptographic operations. Additionally, encryption and other measures can be used to protect keys when they need to be transported to another host computer.
Although software-based approaches can offer significant additional protection, an even greater level of security is possible by employing hardware devices, such as HSMs, that are specifically designed to protect confidential electronic keys. Typically, these devices are used to safe-store keys. The keys are created in these devices and cryptographic operations performed with these keys can be carried out within these devices, thus making sure that the keys never need to leave the hardware. Various physical and logical security features of these devices further minimize the risk of key compromise.
If a user’s private key were only protected by a software-based approach, a successful attack could occur if there were co-ordinated security breaches at two customer institutions or two branches of an institution. Such an attack would be relatively difficult but not impossible. Use of an HSM instead of software-based protection would likely make this attack more difficult since it is harder to steal HSM private key information without being detected.
Posted at 09:07 AM in Security Management | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Technorati Tags: Hardware Security Modules, HSM, PKI, Security
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